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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
making the statement are usually questions of fact for the jury.14
Since Derry v. Peek,15 courts have encountered difficulty in formu-
lating any one principle that would be applicable to all cases. They
have decided each case on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 16
The decision in the case at bar dismissing the complaint seems
justified because the statements made to the plaintiff were mere opin-
ions since: (1) plaintiff was himself an expert in violins and could
not have relied on the superior knowledge of the seller and (2) he
was in a position to draw his own conclusions from the documents
presented and the complexity of the instrument. On the other hand,
if the buyer had no knowledge concerning violins and relied solely
on the vendor's statements, a different situation would have been
presented and it would seem that the statements would be deemed
representations.
17
B.B.
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-
Loss OF ACTION DUE TO "HEART BALM" LAw.-Plaintiff sued to
recover damages for criminal conversation and alienation of affec-
tions of his wife, the acts alleged occurring subsequent to the enact-
ment of Article 2-A of the New York Civil Practice Act.' The
Appellate Division of the Second Department declared the statute to
be unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature cannot validly
abrogate a common law action without replacing it with an adequate
substitute. On appeal, held, reversed. Quoting substantially from
the report of Fearon v. Treanor,2 the court ruled that the legislature
146 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROCEDURE (Pop. ed. 1909); Marshall v.
Seeley, 49 App. Div. 433, 63 N. Y. Supp. 335 (1st Dept. 1900).
' L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337, H. L. (1889) ; KERR, FAUD & MISTAKE (4th ed.
1910) 397, 400.
16 Frank v. Bradley, 42 App. Div. 178, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1st Dept.
1899); Benedict Co. v. McKeage, 201 App. Div. 761, 195 N. Y. Supp. 288 (3d
Dept. 1922); Brady v. Edwards, 35 Misc. 435, 71 N. Y. Supp. 972 (1901);
Jackson v. Collins, 39 Mich. 557 "(1878) ; Hirschberg Optical Co. v. Michaelsen,
1 Neb. 137, 95 N. W. 461 (1901) ; People's Bank v. Romano, 62 P. (2d) 445
(1936).1 In Powell v. Fletcher, 45 St. R. 294, 18 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1892), it was
held that where a dealer in violins is an expert and the buyer is not, a false
and fraudulent opInion will make the vendor liable.
'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT art. 2-A, § 61b: "The rights of action heretofore
existing to recover sums of money as damages for the alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of promise to marry are hereby
abolished."
2Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 5 N. E. (2d) 815 (1936) (declaring
constitutional that, part of Section 61b abolishing remedies for seduction and
breach of promise to marry).
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has plenary powers in dealing with the subject of marriage,3 that
marriage is not a civil contract within the meaning of the Federal
Constitution,4 and that in the instant case the legislature has not acted
arbitrarily or unreasonably but has validly exercised its police power
which is above constitutional inhibitions.5 Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274
N. Y. 22, 8 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937).
At early common law a wife, in relation to her husband, was
regarded as a servant or dependent rather than an equal and was
expected to look to him for protection against wrongs at the hands
of others.6 The husband looked only to himself for protection against
interference with the family rights, his usual remedy being the inflic-
tion of personal chastisement upon his wife.7 At the time, this condi-
tion was not only tolerated but condoned by the courts.8 Gradually,
as legal principles became modified, the civil remedies for alienation
of affections and criminal conversation were resorted to rather than
the harsher but perhaps more efficacious remedy of personal violence.9
The form of the remedy was a special action on the case by the hus-
band against one who should seduce his wife or entice her away from
him,10 the ground of such action being the infliction of some one or
more of the following injuries: (1) dishonor of the marriage bed;
(2) loss of the wife's affections;" 1 (3) loss of the comfort of the"
wife's society; (4) total or partial loss of the wife's services; and
(5) the mortification and shame which always accompanies this do-
mestic wrong. The action for seducing the wife away from the hus-
band was by no means confined to the case of improper or adulterous
relations; 12 but it extended to all cases of wrongful interference in
3 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888).
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10 (prohibiting states from impairing the obligation
of contracts),
Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 122 Sup. Ct. 57, 58 (1929).
COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 464.
State v. Rhodes, 1 N. C. 453 (1845).8 Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307 (1836) ("when the wife is ill-treated on
account of her own misconduct, her remedy is in a reform of her manners").
Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 452, 18 S. W. 9 (1892).
Ferguson v. Smethers, 70 Ind. 519 (1880) ("Recovery may be had for
loss of consortium, implied in crim. con., .whether the intercourse is with
or against her will and although no loss of service results") ; Wales v. Miner,
89 Ind. 118 (1883) ("Where the gist of the action is crim. con. no recovery
can be had for loss of service * * * unless the crim. con. is proved");
Wood v. Matthews, 47 Iowa 409 (1877) ("There must be proof of actual
marriage to maintain the action").
"In Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120 (N. Y. 1866), an action was sus-
tained by a husband against one who was alleged to have poisoned and prejudiced
the mind of his wife against him, alienated her affections, counseled and aided
her to commence proceedings for divorce, whereby she refused to recognize
or receive him as her husband, though she did not abandon him.
"Willis v. Bernard, 8 Bing. 376 (C. P. 1832) ("The wife's letters or
statements may be proved to show the previous state of their relations and her
feelings towards her husband") ; Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 Watts 355, 34 Am. Dec.
469 (1839); Palmer v. Crook, 7 Gray 418 (Mass. 1856); Holtz v. Dick, 42
Ohio St. 23 (1884).
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the family affairs of others whereby the wife was induced to leave
the husband, or so conduct herself that the comfort of the married
life was destroyed.
Today this right of action no longer exists in view of the Hanf-
garn and Fearon cases and the fact that the Supreme Court of the
United States has recently decided that no substantial federal question
is involved.' 3 Thus the constitutionality of Article 2-A may be re-
garded as definitely established insofar as it concerns the abolition of
"heart balm" suits. "This does not mean that husband and wife are
no longer entitled to mutual chastity; the statute merely takes away
the right of action." 14 It will be interesting to note if the courts will
once more take cognizance of the remedies employed by outraged
husbands during the early common law.
R. J.M.
CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE-
W11AT CONSTITUTES CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE.-The defendant was
indicted for manslaughter in the second degree I for having with
culpable negligence smoked and handled a cigarette so as to set fire
to a dwelling, causing the death of one of the occupants thereof. The
evidence that was presented to the grand jury showed that the defen-
dant, after drinking three bottles of beer, fell asleep while smoking a
cigarette. He was later aroused by smoke and heat and ran to the
street leaving his door open and failing to warn any other occupants
of the premises. The defense moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that the legal evidence received by the grand jury was insuffi-
cient to support the indictment. Held, motion granted, with leave to
the district attorney to resubmit the case to the grand jury. Culpable
negligence is something more than the slight negligence necessary to
support a civil action for damages.2 People v. Hoffman, 162 Misc.
677, 294 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1937).
The facts of the instant case presented to the court another oppor-
tunity to discuss the degree of negligence required to constitute
13 May 24, 1937-Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by Catherine Fearon
challenging the constitutionality of Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act;
October 1, 1937-Lawrence Hanfgarn filed a petition with the Supreme Court
to have Article 2-A declared unconstitutional (motion pending).
14 EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 148.
PENAL LAW § 1052: "Such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree,
when committed without a design to effect death: 3. By any act, procurement
or culpable negligence of any person, which, according to the provisions of this
article, does not constitute the crime of murder in the first or second degree,
nor manslaughter in the first degree." (Italics supplied.)
'People v. Angelo. 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394 (1927) ; State v. Goetz,
83 Conn. 437, 76 At. 1000 (1910).
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